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1. Introduction: The Role of Distance 
 
The externalization of European border control can be defined as the 
range of processes whereby European actors and Member States 
complement policies to control migration across their territorial 
boundaries with initiatives that realize such control extra-territorially and 
through other countries and organs rather than their own. The 
phenomenon has multiple dimensions. The spatial dimension captures the 
remoteness of the geographical distance that is interposed between the 
locus of power and the locus of surveillance. But there is also a relational 
dimension, regarding the multiplicity of actors engaged in the venture 
through bilateral and multilateral interactions, usually through coercive 
dynamics of conditional reward, incentive, or penalization. And there are 
functional and instrumental dimensions too, concerning the cost-
effectiveness of distance-creation (in both ethical and legal grounds) vis-
à-vis the (unwanted) migrant, who, removed from sight, is no longer 
considered of concern to the supervising State,1 and the range of 
externalizing policy devices at the service of externalising agents in terms 
of purpose, format, delivery, and ultimate control.2 European borders thus 
(re-)emerge as ubiquitous, multi-modal and translational systems of 
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1 The “where” of borders matters and determines access to protection. See, e.g., M 
Dikeç, “The ‘Where’ of Asylum” (2009) 27 Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 183; P Novak, “The Neoliberal Location of Asylum” (2019) 70 Political Geography 
1. 
2 On this multi-dimensional taxonomy of externalization, see R Zaiotti, ‘Mapping 
Remote Control: The Externalization of Migration Management in the 21st Century’, in 
Zaiotti (ed.), Externalizing Migration Management (Routledge 2016), chapter 1. 
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coercion – as an interconnected network of “little Guantánamos”.3 This, 
in turn, creates a distance, both physically and ethically, that is utilized to 
shift away concomitant responsibilities.4  
Distance, as the next sections will demonstrate, plays a crucial role 
as a mechanism not only of dispersion of legal duties, blurring the lines of 
causation and making attribution of wrongful conduct a difficult task, but 
also as an artefact of oppression and displacement in itself. It does not 
prevent (unwanted) migration but rather makes it unviable through 
legally sanctioned, safe channels, diverting it through ever more perilous 
routes. The immediate effect of this distance that externalization 
engenders is at least threefold. First, it leads to the disempowerment of 
migrants, who are left with no options for safe and legal escape, being 
instead coerced into dangerous courses operated by smugglers. Second, it 
legitimizes the actors enforcing externalized control on behalf, and for the 
benefit, of the European Union and its Member States. Repressive forces 
in third countries gain standing as valid interlocutors for cooperation, as a 
result; their democratic and human rights credentials becoming 
secondary, if at all relevant, as the Libyan case illustrates below. Third, 
legal alternatives, like the relaxation of controls or the creation of safe 
and regular pathways, are rejected; perceived as an illogical concession to 
the failure of the externalization project. 
The final outcome, and what constitutes the focus of this 
contribution, is the ‘border-induced displacement’ effect,5 resulting from 
the combination of the processes of extraterritorialisation and 
externalization taken together. Border-induced displacement is not 
equivalent to the original reasons forcing people into exile, but rather 
functions as a second-order type of (re-)displacement, produced precisely 
via (the violence implicated in) border control. This then leads to forms 
of “engineered regionalism”, that is, politics re-producing displacement in 
certain areas closest to the origin of flows.6 “Safe third country” rules and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 M Gibney, ‘A Thousand Little Guantánamos: Western States and Measures to 
Prevent the Arrival of Refugees’, in K Tunstall (ed.), Displacement, Asylum and 
Migration: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2004 (Oxford University Press 2006), 139. See 
also P Novak, ‘The Flexible Territoriality of Borders’ (2011) 16 Geopolitics 741.  
4 For a legal elaboration, see V Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2017), chapter 2. 
5 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Forcing Flows of Migrants: European Externalization and 
Border-Induced Displacement’, in DJ Andersen, M Klatt, and M Sandberg (eds), The 
Border Multiple (Ashgate 2012), 35.   
6 M Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered Regionalism, and Justice between 
States’, in S Kneebone and F Rawlings-Sanaei (eds), New Regionalism and Asylum 
Seekers (Berghahn Books, 2007), 59. 
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practices are the main vehicle of this development, discernible also within 
the EU, where the Dublin System has “rulified” an asymmetric allocation 
of responsibility for asylum claims to peripheral countries situated at the 
external common frontiers of the Union, like Spain, Italy and Greece.7 In 
the case of externalization, border-induced displacement is then imposed 
upon already-displaced persons by non-European actors implementing 
the EU’s pre-emptive control agenda, reinforcing prevailing patterns of 
exploitation and existing hierarchies of exclusion and subordination.  
The ethical and legal consequences of ‘distance-creation’ are what 
we turn to analyse in the remainder of this article. Section 2 pays 
attention to the assumptions and ethical and political-economic 
dimensions behind this strategy, discussing exit control, coercion, and the 
democratic legitimization of unelected actors enforcing the EU border 
within third countries. Section 3 investigates the legal impact of 
externalization and extraterritorialization, centring on the apparent 
accountability gaps that it generates, contesting the legality of 
responsibility dispersion mechanisms. The overall conclusion we reach is 
that the “rulification” of externalization at EU level does not render it 
ethically and legally tenable under international law. The “lawification” 
at EU level of practices inconsistent with human rights is insufficient to 
render them compatible with international legal standards. 
 
 
2. Ethical Distance-Creation: Examining Attempts to Justify 
Externalization and Border-Induced Displacement 
 
Although immigration ethics has thrived as a discipline since its late 
arrival in the 1980s, debates on border control between cosmopolitanism 
and liberal nationalism have often remained at an ideational level and 
generally based on liberal democratic foundations,8 thus overlooking the 
composite ways through which border control is realized and experienced 
on the ground. This includes practices of externalization and extra-
territorialization. Often, the assumptions guiding ethical debates on 
border control have reproduced a territorially trapped gaze, circumscribed 
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8 J Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’ (1987) 49; B Barry and 
RE Goodin (eds) Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People 
and Money (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992); M Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, 
and Autonomy’ (2002) 30 Philosophy & Public Affairs 257; M Gibney, The Ethics and 
Politics of Asylum. Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees (Cambridge 
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by methodological nationalism,9 which, through a set of idealized 
premises, reduces the complex and transnational dynamics of 
displacement and border control to a phenomenon of mis-placement 
between territorially bordered societies.10 Such reduction is marred by 
what can be called reactive and regionalist postulations. These view 
border control, first, as a manifestation of State agency, and, second, as 
only a response to migration flows. Third, they naturalize the containment 
of displacement within certain regions, perceiving the phenomenon as 
geographically and morally distant from Europe.  
But immigration ethics is far from alone in reproducing 
methodological nationalism and reactive and regionalist conjectures, as 
these mirror prevailing paradigms about the relationship between 
displacement and borders.11 However, it is instructive, nonetheless, to 
examine European externalization by applying existing ethical debates 
about the democratic legitimacy, coercion, and rights of border control to 
the issue of externalization.12 
 
 
2.1 The Democratic Legitimacy Question  
 
One fundamental debate has concerned the democratic legitimacy of 
border control as such. Assuming that freedom and democracy are 
instrumentally valuable for securing individual autonomy, a principled 
concern is that the coercive aspects of border control amount to violations 
of autonomy when they happen without the consent of those exposed to 
them. In order for border control to be legitimate from a liberal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 J Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory’ (1994) 1 Review of International Political Economy 51; A Wimmer and 
N Glik Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond’ (2002) 2 Global Networks 301. 
10 The dominant grounding of ethical debates about border control on a fusion of 
liberal democratic values and methodological nationalism also means that critical 
engagement has been neglected concerning the politically popular perspectives, which 
refuse universal, liberal norms, and question or reject rights-regimes and the associated 
state obligations. This is beyond the scope of the current analysis, see though M Lemberg-
Pedersen, ‘The “Imaginary World” of Nationalistic Ethics: Feasibility constraints 
on Nordic deportation corridors targeting unaccompanied Afghan minors’ (2018) 12 
Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 47. 
11 Generally on the different epistemological approaches to the relationship between 
migration and borders and their contradictions, see P Novak, ‘Back to Borders’ (2017) 43 
Critical Sociology 847. 
12 Cf. A Abizadeh ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion’ (2008) 36 Political 
Theory 37; D Miller, ‘Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive’ (2010) 38 Political 
Theory 111. 
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democratic perspective, it would have to be justifiable to non-members – 
however the demos may initially be defined – through a deliberative 
process.13 Yet, proponents of border control might argue that access to 
asylum procedures can resolve this concern, if asylum applications are 
seen as granting such deliberative voice to them. Although this debate has 
only concerned an undifferentiated notion of border control, we can 
extend it to the politics of externalization, if we imagine proponents to 
argue that, if externalized control is able to respect individual autonomy, 
it might also be deemed democratically legitimate.14 The strength of such 
an argument will then depend on the meaning and function of 
externalization. 
European externalization processes occur when European Member 
States, through bi-, multi- or supranational venues, complement policies 
of controlling cross-border migration into their territories with pre-
emptive initiatives realizing such control extra-territorially and/or through 
sub-contracting to actors and agencies other than their own.15 
Externalization has been discussed in terms of policy transfer, issue-
linkages, and ripple effects,16 but, crucially, its dynamics apply also to 
intra-European relations. For many years, the Dublin system has served 
to transfer the border control burdens of North-Western Member States to 
South-Eastern ones, causing heated discussions about lacking solidarity,17 
similar to those between European and non-European countries.18  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See also P Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and 
Immigration (Edinburgh University Press 2000). 
14 This argument faces further myriad problems that we will not be able to address 
for reasons of space. These concern how to determine the proportional and legitimate 
levels of coercion that the access to asylum would allow, whether asylum procedures are 
deliberative in the manner required to fulfil the conditions of autonomy, etc. 
15 M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 5); V Moreno-Lax (n 4), chapters 4, 5 and 6; T Balzacq, 
‘The Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs’, in T Balzacq (ed.), The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home 
Affairs (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 1.  
16 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Effective Protection or Effective Combat? EU Border 
Control and North Africa’, in P Gaibazzi, S Dünnwald and A Bellagamba (eds), 
EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 36; S 
Lavenex and EM Uçarer, ‘The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of 
Immigration Policies’ (2004) 39 Cooperation and Conflict 417. 
17 For a recent critique, see E Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in 
Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing?’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 
448. 
18 Cf. D Mara and C Nathler, ‘Tunisian Migrant Issue Dominates EU Interior 
Minister Talks’, Deutsche Welle, 11 April 2011, www.dw.com/en/tunisian-migrant-issue-
dominates-eu-interior-minister-talks/a-14981095. For a legal perspective, see V Moreno-
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Justifications offered for externalization oscillate between grammars 
of securitized control and humanitarian care.19 For instance, the June 
2018 proposal by the EU ministers about “controlled centres” and 
“regional disembarkation platforms”, whereto “boat migrants” can be 
deported, is framed as an innovative idea allowing Member States both to 
“stem illegal migration” and simultaneously save vulnerable migrants by 
breaking the “business model” of smugglers and traffickers purportedly 
in accordance with human rights and the rule of law.20 
Yet, the 2018 externalization proposal is not as innovative as it may 
seem. Between the 1980s and mid-2000s, five very similar – and 
similarly controversial – externalization proposals were put forth by the 
British, Danish, Dutch, and German governments and by the European 
Commission. And they all revolved around externalized centres in 
Eastern Europe and North Africa whereto EU Member States would send 
asylum seekers or interdicted “boat migrants”. The terminologies varied 
from “regional protection areas” by the British, “processing centres” by 
the Danes, “reception centres” by the Dutch, “EU reception centres” by 
the German, and “Regional Protection Programmes” (RPPs) by the 
European Commission.21 All but the RPP proposal focused on 
administrative deportation from European territory, so that, as put by the 
Blair government, “refoulement should be possible and the notion of an 
asylum seeker in[land] should die”.22 By 2005, the German proposal had 
dropped any talk of extraterritorial asylum processing and moved on to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lax, ‘Solidarity’s Reach: Meaning, Dimensions and Implications for EU (External) 
Asylum Policy’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 740. 
19 Cf. J Carling and M Hernández-Carretero, ‘Protecting Europe and Protecting 
Migrants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa’ (2011) 13 The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 43; P Pallister-Wilkins, ‘The 
Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing’ (2015) 9 International Political 
Sociology 53; P Cuttitta, ‘Delocalization, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: The 
Mediterranean Border Between Exclusion and Inclusion’ (2018) 50 Antipode 783; and V 
Moreno-Lax, ‘The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitization of Human Rights: The 
“Rescue-through-Interdiction/Rescue-without-Protection” Paradigm’ (2018) 56 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 119. 
20 European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018, Press Release 421/18. See also 
European Commission, Migration: Regional Disembarkation Arrangements, 24 July 2018, 
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20180724_factsheet-regional-disembarkation-arrangements_en.pdf.  
21 For analysis, see M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 10); G Noll, ‘Visions of the Exceptional: 
Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones‘ 
(2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 303; V Moreno-Lax, ‘External 
Dimension’, in S Peers, V Moreno-Lax, M Garlick and E Guild (eds), EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law (Brill, 2nd edn., 2015) vol 3, chapter 10. 
22 UK Government New Vision for Refugees (White Paper, 2003), 9. 
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identifying Libya as a promising collaborator for pre-emptive 
containment.23 In light of the concurrent dysfunctional intra-European 
dynamics of the Dublin system, the proposals between 1986 and 2018 
illustrate how the externalization logic has long been invoked as a magic 
remedy to the Dublin ills, always couched in crisis-laden and emergency-
driven rhetoric, while also holding out vague promises of protection. 
Externalization can be criticized for co-opting protection in favour of 
methods of “consensual containment” that re-produce displacement in 
regions neighbouring the EU.24 For instance, especially since 2017, Italy 
and the EU have pursued a policy of transferring search and rescue to the 
so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG), thereby effectively turning 
missions into operations of exit control. It is due to their material 
contribution and close involvement in the internal command-and-control 
structure of the Libyan forces that the LYCG performed 19,452 pull-
backs in 2017.25 Political discourses on externalization can, however, be 
seen as arguing that this kind of regionalist engineering creates 
“protection elsewhere” based on three claims, popular in ethical 
discussions on border control within liberal national regimes. In the 
following, we analyse them through standing ethical debates about 
coercion and prevention, peoples’ rights to enter and exit territories, and 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
 
2.2 Coercion: From “Protection Elsewhere” to “Protection Nowhere” 
 
First comes the claim that border control, and thus also its 
externalized manifestations, is not illegitimately coercive, because it is 
only preventive. Here, coercion has been referred to as when individuals 
are forced to do a specific thing, while prevention is taken to mean when 
they are forced not to do a specific thing.26 Second comes the 
aforementioned argument that border control can be legitimate when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Bundesministers des Innern Effektiver Schutz für Flüchtlinge, wirkungsvölle 
Bekämpfung illegaler Migration – überlegungen des Bundesministers des Innern zur 
Errichtung einer EU-Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Nordafrika (Pressemitteilung, 2005), 3-6. 
24 V Moreno-Lax and MG Giuffré, ‘The Raise of Consensual Containment: From 
“Contactless Control” to “Contactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows’, S Juss 
(ed.), Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar forthcoming), 
www.unhcr.org/5a056ca07.pdf.   
25 IOM, Maritime Update Libyan Coast, 25 October-28 November 2017, 
www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Libya-Maritime-Update-
Libyan-25Oct-28Nov.pdf. 
26 These definitions of coercion and prevention are offered by D Miller (n 12), 114. 
8 
	  
agreed upon democratically.27 Third follows the statement of an 
entry/exit-asymmetry signifying that people’s rights against one State not 
to prevent them from exiting its territory is held to be morally paramount, 
but that it does not entail an equally forceful obligation on any other State 
to let them enter their territory.28  
Combining these claims, we then arrive at a “protection elsewhere” 
argument maintaining that externalization is legitimate, since agreed to by 
all governments involved, and because it preserves displaced persons’ 
rights through extraterritorial asylum processing. Even if the policy may 
block their movement, this argument goes, it only prevents them from 
entering European territory, while still allowing them to find protection 
elsewhere, after having exited their own country. The zero-sum game 
effect that the generalisation of this policy would generate goes unaverted 
– if all countries did the same there would be “protection nowhere”.29 
But this argument is categorically flawed. Its definitions of coercion 
and prevention are problematic and rest upon a disconnect between 
abstract assumptions about border control guiding liberal nationalistic 
immigration ethics and the actual reality of displacement and European 
border surveillance, discounting its concrete effects on the ground. EU 
externalization practices yield extremely coercive checks amounting to 
violent regimes of exit control, also contravening the legally-sanctioned 
right – assumed in debates on immigration ethics – to leave one’s own 
country.30 That is, even if one, for the sake of argument, assumes the right 
to exit to hold more value than that of entry – since at international law 
one is universally applicable while the other is only opposable to one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A Abizadeh (n 12), 47. Miller and Abizadeh disagree on the boundaries of the 
demos involved, but this is not crucial to the stated version of the externalization argument. 
28 D Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford University Press 
2007), 207-209. Arguably, the assumption of such asymmetry reflects the norms of Cold 
War migration geopolitics, epitomized by the condemnation of the Berlin Wall, and 
emphasizing the ethical value of allowing individuals persecuted by totalitarian regimes to 
exit territories. But today, the border control systems of European countries, purportedly 
liberal democratic, also involve practices of walling, fencing, and exit control. Moreover, a 
principled ethical critique of the entry/exit-asymmetry has also been that the very reasons 
why emigration might be crucial for securing individuals’ fundamental rights, and thus 
autonomy, may also apply equally strongly to the reasons why people try to immigrate. Cf. 
N Holtug, ‘The Ethics of Immigration Policy’ (2011) 1 Nordic Journal of Migration 
Research 4. 
29 For a legal elaboration see, V Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of the “Safe Third 
Country” Notion Contested: Insights from the Law of Treaties’, in Goodwin-Gill and 
Weckel (eds), Migration & Refugee Protection in the 21st Century (Nijhoff 2015) 665. 
30 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François 
Crépeau, A/HRC/29/36 (2015). 
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own country31 – actual externalization practices still violate not just the 
latter, but also the former.32 The containment of migrants in Libyan 
detention structures, for instance, reveals an abusive regime that bars 
access to asylum. Amnesty International has counted twenty reports from 
reliable monitors, including UN and EU sources, attesting to this reality.33 
The abject brutality facing displaced persons, contained and circulated 
through externalization, can only be labelled non-coercive prevention 
from a Eurocentric, and extremely abstract vantage point. In truth, they 
cause suffering on such a scale that they may amount to atrocity crimes, 
according to the ICC Prosecutor,34 and, as the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights has put it, they constitute “an outrage to the conscience 
of humanity” – at least as far as the situation in Libya is concerned.35 
Collaborative border infrastructures are endowed with the power to 
coerce at a distance, with externalization leading to practices of “remote 
control” that extraterritorially negate access to the European asylum 
systems to those (theoretically) entitled to international protection,36 
literally “trapping” migrants in a constant “cycle of abuse”.37  
Nevertheless, even if the ethical “protection elsewhere” argument 
must be rejected as an invalid justification for current European 
externalization policies the reasons for it are instructive. Seeing how 
externalization produces highly coercive collaborative regimes of exit 
control makes clear the problematic ramifications of the reactive and 
regionalist assumptions on which it rests. Conventional views on 
international relations and forced migration see the displacement to which 
borders respond as induced by conflicts or developmental or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For a full-length analysis of the right to leave, see V Moreno-Lax (n 4), chapter 9. 
32 Ibid. Cf. N Markard, ‘The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration 
Control by Third Countries’ (2106) 27 European Journal of International Law 591. 
33 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion (December 2017), 56-58, 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/7561/2017/en. See also Human Rights Watch, No 
Escape from Hell (January 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-
hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya.  
34 ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation 
in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), 8 November 2017, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc. 
35 ‘UN Human Rights Chief: Suffering of Migrants in Libya Outrage to Conscience 
of Humanity’, Press Release, 14 November 2017, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22393&LangI
D=E.  
36 L Bialasiewicz, ‘Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and 
EU Border Work in the Mediterranean’ (2012) 17 Geopolitics 843. 
37 Amnesty International, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (August 2018), 
18, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3089062018ENGLISH.pdf. 
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environmental factors.38 Yet, while attention to the causes of 
displacement is important, this model embraces borders as only reactive 
to – rather than also constitutive of – displacement. But this is wrong. A 
range of border practices and infrastructures, performed at or beyond the 
physical frontiers of the EU, such as interdiction, detention, and 
deportation, do not just react to, but also in themselves cause 
displacement, by diverting flows towards increasingly dangerous routes 
and by multiplying death ratios at sea and at border zones.39 This “border-
induced displacement”, therefore, challenges the regionalist and reactive 
premise that the production of forced migration is primarily a problem 
created outside European territory and agency and contests the structural 
incorporation of (foreseeably lethal) coercion as a legitimate mechanism 
of border control. 
EU-Libyan relations, since the 2000s, illustrate how externalization 
has built the infrastructures enabling this kind of coercive re-
displacement. This problematizes prevailing assumptions still dominating 
immigration ethics and politics, namely that the agency of border control 
consists of States’ discretion over movement across their territorial 
borders. Externalization underscores the need to consider more composite 
notions of agency – and thus responsibility – decoupled from national 
territories, and spanning several governments, organisations as well as 
non-state actors.  
The decades-long European-Libyan collaboration on border control 
is a case in point. After the European Commission decided to lift its arms 
embargo against Libya in 2004, two “technical missions” followed. The 
first, in 2004, was meant to “identify concrete measures for possible 
balanced EU-Libyan cooperation particularly on illegal immigration” and 
the second, in 2007, to develop “an operational and technical partnership” 
for extraterritorial border control.40 The case of Libya is but one example 
of how European externalization policies have facilitated the 
transformation of European border control into a flourishing market of 
violent deterrence and containment,41 with little to do with a rights-based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 A Betts, Forced migration and global politics (Wiley-Blackwell 2009), 4-10. 
39 M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 16), 54-6; V Moreno-Lax (n 4), chapters 3 to 6. Among 
others, The Human Cost of Border Control project provides primary source information 
and statistical evidence of these correlations, http://www.borderdeaths.org/. 
40 Cf. Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal Migration, 27 November–6 December 
2004, Council doc. 7753/05, www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/eu-report-libya-ill-
imm.pdf; Frontex-led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya, 28 May–5 June 
2007, www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-libya-frontex-report.pdf. 
41 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Private Security Companies and the European 
Borderscapes’, in N Nyberg Sørensen and T Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Migration 
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protection paradigm, and also how third countries’ control apparatuses 
have become a lucrative export venture for the arms-, security-, and IT-
industries of the EU Member States.42  
 
 
2.3 Trading in Rights for Border Control 
 
Companies like Spanish Indra, British BAE Systems, Italian 
Leonardo, French Thales and Ocea, Dutch Damen, German Rheinmetall 
and Airbus all compete for contracts to expand the capacity for 
surveillance and control of not just Libya, but also other Eastern 
European, North African and Middle Eastern countries collaborating on 
EU externalization. In 2012, an industrial consulting actor valued the 
global border industry at €25.8 billion, projecting an increase to €56 
billion by 2022.43 And European sales of patrol boats, jeeps, planes, 
drones, satellites, helicopters, radar systems and whole surveillance 
mechanisms for border control purposes were part of the EU export 
licenses worth €82 billion to the Middle East and North Africa between 
2005–2014.44 This political economy of externalization also applies to the 
industries of EU partner countries. For instance, in 2016, the EU 
channelled more than €83 million to contracts with Turkish Aselsan and 
Otokar to provide heavily armoured vehicles placed, respectively, at the 
Greek-Turkish border and the newly constructed 911 kilometre border-
wall between Turkey and Syria.45  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration (Routledge 2013) 152; R 
Andersson, Illegality Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe 
(University of California Press 2014); T Baird, ‘Interest Groups and Strategic 
Constructivism: Business Actors and Border Security in the European Union‘ (2017) 44 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 118. 
42 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Security, Industry and Migration in European Border 
Control’, A Weinar, S Bonjour and L Zhyznomirska (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the 
Politics of Migration in Europe (Routledge 2018) 239.  
43 Frost & Sullivan, Global Border and Maritime Security Market Assessment 
Human-Intensive Security on the Border and Maritime Domain Will Increase the Demand 
for New Technology (February 2014), 965 et seq., http://www.frost.com/sublib/display-
report.do?id=M965-01-00-00-00.  
44 Seventeenth annual report according to art 8(2) of Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment, [2016] OJ C 163/1. 
45 Z Şentek and S Arsu, ‘No Way Out: The European Union is Funding Military 
Equipment used by Turkey to Stop Refugees from Fleeing the Syrian Civil War and 
Entering the EU’, The Black Sea, 23 March 2018, theblacksea.eu/billions-for-
borders/article/en/no-way-out#.  
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The dynamics reshaping third-country border infrastructures 
elucidate how borders can function as engines of, rather than just 
responses to, displacement. This means that arguments for externalization 
appealing to democratic legitimacy face more problems than merely the 
barring of access to asylum procedures: First, because when EU Member 
States use their political-economic leverage to make externalization deals 
with non-EU countries, they are effectively asking them to replace their 
own public interest with the EU preference of avoiding asylum seeker 
flows towards the Member States. Second, because several examples, like 
the EU collaboration with Libyan actors, including militias and former 
traffickers, as further discussed in the next section, illustrate how the 
EU’s externalization partners very often lack democratic legitimacy.46 EU 
border externalization entrenches forms of undemocratic governance in 
third countries, empowering undemocratic actors, transforming their 
relative weight within domestic structures, and weakening democratic 
channels of scrutiny, accountability, and power control. Externalization 
thereby risks creating a vicious cycle, where the influx of arms and funds 
to those actors willing to enact the European containment agenda grants 
them political validity, which is then used to undermine not only migrant 
rights, but also to repress domestic opposition and dissidence and thus 
destabilize internal democratisation processes. The short-term European 
goal of preventing asylum seeker flows thereby risks compromising the 
stated long-term goal of tackling the root causes of displacement,47 which 
is sacrificed in the altar of externalised “integrated border 
management”.48  
 
 
3. Legal Distance-Creation: The Juridical Implications of 
Externalization and Border-Induced Displacement 
 
Externalization has not only been encapsulated in political and 
policy arguments and practices, but has also been embedded in law 
through the “protection elsewhere” model. The “protection elsewhere” 
model ultimately rests on the assumption that refugees and migrants are 
best served “at home”, whether it be in their countries of origin or in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 E.g. ‘Libyan Militia Cash in on EU’s Anti-Smuggling Strategy’, EU Observer, 5 
October 2018, euobserver.com/migration/143003.   
47 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Externalizing Brutality to Libya Is Not an Answer to 
Displacement’, ECRE Op-Ed, 1 December 2017, www.ecre.org/op-ed-externalizing-
brutality-to-libya-is-not-an-answer-to-displacement.  
48 Art 77(1)(c) TFEU.  
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neighbouring region (but away from the EU at any rate). “Onward 
movements” defy this logic and are thus seriously penalized. 
Responsibility for reception and asylum has accordingly been delegated 
(or redirected) to countries proximate to the source of flows, via targeted 
rules on “safe third countries” and readmission agreements that legalise 
the practice. But, as stated above, this (re-)allocation of protection duties 
to peripheral States is also part and parcel of the Common European 
Asylum System within the EU. The Dublin Regulation enshrines and 
“rulifies” this vision for the Member States, allowing non-external border 
countries to deflect responsibility in a legal manner.  
Against this background, EU countries feel legitimized to claim their 
own irresponsibility vis-à-vis non-Member States,49 projecting the model 
onto their external relations and imposing compliance with EU control 
rules as a matter of course. Fatalities at sea and elsewhere are then 
presented as the result of disorder and illegality; something avoidable if 
only (EU) rules were observed and effectively enforced by non-EU 
partners. The structural conditions imposed by the externalization 
apparatus, and the injustice that ensues, are usually disregarded or 
downplayed as unintended collateral damage. The fact that illegality is 
the only way out of a situation of want or persecution, and that smuggling 
is the only remaining vehicle to reach safety, is routinely silenced. It is 
the smugglers who profit of the precarious situation of “boat migrants” – 
the argument goes. So, the eradication of smuggling and a return to (EU) 
law and order is portrayed as the solution. The option to relax border 
control rules and adapt them to the imperatives of human dignity, 
decriminalising the irregular movement of forced migrants, is not even 
contemplated. That would be perceived as an illogical concession; a 
descent into chaos and the negation of the rule of (EU) law. This EU-
centric conception of the law is what sustains the externalization edifice 
and nurtures the collaboration with third countries.   
At the legal-strategic level, externalization politics are accompanied 
by at least two degrees of “irresponsibilitization”, enshrined in, and 
sanctioned by, EU law: responsibility diffusion and responsibility denial. 
“Diffusion” refers to the relational dimension of externalization, to 
situations of multi-actor alliance where the causation chain and 
attribution operation become unclear, with different agents and organs of 
different States contributing to a particular (unlawful) result. By contrast, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Cf. S Fine and T Lindemann, ‘European Democracies and the Responsibility to 
Not Protect’, Open Democracy, 20 September 2018, www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-
make-it/shoshana-fine-thomas-lindemann/european-democracies-and-responsibility-to-not-
pro.  
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“denial” captures scenarios of outright disclaiming of responsibility, 
where this is said to belong to a different actor altogether, according to 
the (usually EU-based) rules in place (or their self-serving interpretation).  
 
 
3.1 Responsibility Diffusion 
 
The creation of physical distance, via exit control, disembarkation 
platforms, holding sites, or reception camps abroad, contributes to 
“irresponsibilitization” through diffusion. None of the proposals put forth 
so far clarifies exactly who should be considered responsible for those 
intercepted in, and repatriated to, Libya or any alternative location 
hosting the centres. The overall supposition appears to be that EU 
Member States would ultimately escape the task.50 But there is some 
residual notion that European countries could not completely 
“circumvent” their obligations51 – albeit without elaboration, even the 
Legal Service of the European Parliament concedes that migrants sent to 
disembarkation platforms located outside the territory of the Member 
States “should benefit from the guarantees provided for in the 1951 
Geneva Convention […] and in the European Convention of Human 
Rights”, including the principle of non-refoulement.52 
Actually, under international law, “no State can avoid responsibility 
by outsourcing or contracting out its obligations”.53 Cooperation with 
third countries does not exonerate EU Member States from their non-
refoulement and related duties – both under general customary law and as 
per the relevant international Conventions.54 According to the Strasbourg 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For a similar analysis, see F Maiani, ‘“Regional Disembarkation Platforms” and 
“Controlled Centres”: Lifting The Drawbridge, Reaching out Across The Mediterranean, 
or Going Nowhere?’, EU Migration Law Blog, 18 September 2018, 
eumigrationlawblog.eu/regional-disembarkation-platforms-and-controlled-centres-lifting-
the-drawbridge-reaching-out-across-the-mediterranean-or-going-nowhere. 
51 ‘Theo Francken Accuses EU of Hypocrisy’, The Brussels Times, 7 June 2018, 
www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/11558/theo-francken-accuses-eu-of-hypocrisy. 
52 Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament, Re: LIBE – European 
Union asylum and immigration policies – Regional disembarkation platforms and 
controlled centres – European Council Conclusions of 28th of June 2018 (on file with the 
authors), paragraphs 44, 45, 53, and 58. 
53 G Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extraterritorial Processing of Claims to Asylum or 
Protection: The Legal Responsibilities of States and International Organisations’ (2007) 9 
UTS Law Review 26, 34. See also M Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum 
(Hart 2012), chapter 7. 
54 See further V Moreno-Lax, ‘Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a 
Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ (2011) 23 
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Court, “[w]here States establish [...] international agreements to pursue 
cooperation in certain fields of activity”, whatever their legal nature, 
validity, and intent,55 “there may be implications for the protection of 
fundamental rights”. With this in mind, it would be “incompatible with 
the purpose and object of the [European Convention of Human Rights]56 
if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such 
[agreements]”.57 As a result, “[i]n so far as any liability under the 
Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the 
Contracting State [...]”.58 Despite its cooperation with Libya or any other 
third country, the independent responsibility of each EU Member State 
participating in the scheme of externalized migration controls subsists, 
“where the person[s] in question [...] risk suffering a flagrant denial of the 
guarantees and rights secured to [them] under the Convention”.59  
Nor would Member States be able to evade responsibility by 
transferring functions to the UNHCR or the IOM – whatever their support 
and potential separate liability.60 “Absolving Contracting States 
completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by 
such a transfer would [again] be incompatible with the purpose and object 
of the Convention”, as Strasbourg clarifies. The final effect would be for 
“the guarantees of the Convention [to] be limited or excluded at will 
thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the 
practical and effective nature of its safeguards”,61 negating the basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Journal of Refugee Law 174. See also V Moreno-Lax (n 4) chapter 8 on the 
extraterritorial application of non-refoulement and its legal nature in international law.  
55 These agreements may indeed be null and void ipso jure if they conflict with jus 
cogens norms, pursuant to Art 53 VCLT, which some authors claim is precisely the rank of 
the prohibition of refoulement. See, e.g., J Allain, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-
refoulement’ (2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 533. Cf. C Costello and M 
Foster, ‘Non-refoulement as Custom and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test’  
(2015) 46 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 273. 
56 European Convention on Human Rights [1950] ETS 5 (ECHR). 
57 T.I. v United Kingdom App n. 43844/98 (ECtHR, 7 March 2000), p. 15; K.R.S. v. 
United Kingdom App n. 32733/08 (ECtHR, 2 December 2008), p. 15.  
58 Saadi v United Kingdom App n. 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008), para. 126. 
59 W.M. v Denmark App n. 17392/90 (EComHR, 14 October 1992). 
60 ‘IOM, UNHCR Appeal for Region-Wide Action by EU Countries over 
Mediterranean Tragedies’, UNHCR Press Release, 27 June 2018, 
www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/6/5b33d8bf4/iom-unhcr-appeal-region-wide-action-eu-
Countries-mediterranean-tragedies.html. 
61 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, App n. 
45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005), para. 154. 
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premise of the pacta sunt servanda principle.62 And the same is true in 
regard to other instruments of international human rights law. 
Even though several actors combine to produce re-displacement, 
individual responsibility for its effects cannot be deflected. The principle 
is well established in international law. Article 47 of the ILC Articles on 
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 
contemplates precisely the scenario where several States participate in the 
same internationally wrongful act, stipulating that in such cases “the 
responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act”.63 
Each State retains responsibility and, according to the ILC Commentary, 
“is separately responsible for the conduct attributable to it”. The fact that 
one or more additional States also contribute to the same act in no way 
reduces the responsibility of each single country.64 So, any orders or 
transfers performed, or orchestrated by, EU Member States will engage 
their responsibility for any resulting breaches of their international 
commitments.  
Neither the “disembarkation platforms” proposal, nor any other of 
the similar initiatives emerged since the 1980s explored above specifies 
where exactly those repatriated or “pulled back”, whether to Libya or 
other third countries, would be accommodated.65 It is conceivable that 
proponents envisage offshore reception centres to be closed, since the 
ultimate aim is to contain and deter irregular movement.66 This then 
entails large-scale, and potentially long-term, detention, in breach of 
Article 5 ECHR guarantees,67 which have been recognised to apply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1980] 1155 UNTS 331, (VCLT), art 
26, heading. 
63 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex 
UNGA Res. 56/83 (2001), A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4 (ARSIWA) (emphasis added). 
64 ILC Commentary on Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, fifty-third Sess., A/56/10 (2001), p. 124 (ARSIWA Commentary) 
(emphasis added). See also J Crawford, State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press 
2013), 355.  
65 Note that so far no African country has agreed to the strategy. See ‘EU Admits No 
African Country Has Agreed to Host Migration Centre’, The Guardian, 21 June 2018, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/21/eu-admits-no-african-Country-has-agreed-to-
host-migration-centre.    
66 Some EU leaders have advocated for ‘floating centres’. See A Dastyari and D 
Ghezelbash, ‘Opinion: European Plans for Refugee “Floating Reception Centres” Will 
Endanger Lives’, ABC News, 20 September 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-
20/europe-asylum-seekers-australia-mediterranean-austria-italy/10265238.   
67 Cf. Saadi v United Kingdom (n 58). For a critique, see V Moreno-Lax, ‘Beyond 
Saadi v. UK: Why the “Unnecessary” Detention of Asylum Seekers is Inadmissible under 
EU Law’ (2011) 5 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 166. 
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extraterritorially, extending to cases of deprivation of liberty abroad.68 
Yet, the border-induced displacement effects of externalization practices, 
like involuntary retention in international waters, forcible transfer to 
warships, coercive escorting or imposing of a certain course, constitute 
restrictions of physical freedom and need to accommodate the legal 
safeguards of the Convention.69  
It is not known whether the “disembarkation platforms” proposal 
foresees transfers to the country concerned to be automatic. Should that 
be the case, EU Member States risk incurring direct and indirect 
violations of the prohibition of collective expulsion and the (non-
derogable/non-limitable) protection against refoulement. Regarding the 
latter, the Strasbourg Court attaches paramount importance to country 
information contained in reports from independent sources,70 so that 
when reliable accounts of the circumstances prevailing in the receiving 
State make it “sufficiently real and probable” that the general situation 
entails a “real risk” of ill treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, a 
refoulement presumption is activated and removal cannot be performed.71 
What is more, on account of the absolute character of Article 3, 
Contracting Parties must undertake the relevant investigation proprio 
motu and abstain from actions/omissions that put individuals at risk. As 
the Court asserted in Hirsi, “it [is] for the national authorities, faced with 
a situation in which human rights [are] systematically violated [...] to find 
out about the treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after 
their return”.72 So, the Member States concerned are to comply with their 
non-refoulement obligations proactively, regardless of whether the 
persons in question seek protection or specifically alert of the dangers 
faced upon return. The fact that potential applicants fail to request asylum 
or to formally oppose their removal does not absolve Contracting Parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom App n. 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 
2010). See also Al-Skeini v United Kingdom App n. 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011); Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others v Italy App n. 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012).ì. See further, V 
Moreno-Lax, ‘Hirsi v Italy or the Strasbourg Court v Extraterritorial Migration Control?’ 
(2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 574. 
69 Rigopoulous v Spain App n. 37388/97 (ECtHR, 12 January 1999); Medvedyev v 
France App n. 3394/03 (ECtHR, 10 July 2008). 
70 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (n 68), paragraphs 118 and 123. 
71 Ibid., para 136. 
72 Ibid., para 133. 
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of their Convention duties,73 and especially their positive due diligence 
obligations.  
This includes the requirement to provide access to adequate 
procedures.74 Member States must offer a real opportunity for individuals 
to submit and defend their claims,75 including an “effective remedy”.76 
This requires that the remedy in question be able to “prevent the 
execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose 
effects are potentially irreversible”. Therefore, “it is inconsistent with 
Article 13 [ECHR] for such measures to be executed before the national 
authorities [of the Member State concerned] have examined whether they 
are compatible with the Convention”.77 In these cases, appeals must have 
“automatic suspensive effect”.78 And screening on board interdicting 
vessels or somewhere else offshore cannot satisfy these requirements.79 
Procedural responsibilities, just like substantive guarantees, cannot be 
deflected, postponed, or negated. The ultimate guarantors of ECHR 
safeguards are the Contracting Parties, which must “secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] 
Convention”.80  
Due diligence commands the dual duty to refrain from any conduct 
that may result in arbitrary violations as well as the obligation to enact 
laws and policies that effectively protect individuals against abuse. 
Following the Human Rights Committee’s recent General Comment on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid., paragraphs 133 and 157. See also G Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Right to Seek 
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74 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (n 68), paragraphs 203-204. 
75 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App n. 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011), 
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Parliament 2014), chapter 4, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509989/IPOL_STU(2014)509989_E
N.pdf. 
76 Jabari v Turkey App n. 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000), para 48. 
77 Conka v Belgium App n. 51564/99 (ECtHR, 5 February 2002), para 79 (emphasis 
added). 
78 Gebremedhin v France App n. 25389/05 (ECtHR, 26 April 2007), para 66; I.M. v 
France App n. 9152/09 (ECtHR, 2 May 2012), paragraphs 132, 134-135; A.C. v Spain App 
n. 6528/11 (ECtHR, 22 April 2014), para 95. 
79 Cf. ‘Austria, Italy Propose Processing Refugees on Ships’, Deutsche Welle, 15 
September 2018, www.dw.com/en/austria-italy-propose-processing-refugees-on-ships/a-
45496615.   
80 Art 1 ECHR. For an elaboration and further references, see V Moreno-Lax (n 4), 
chapters 8 and 10. 
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the Right to Life, by analogy, State Parties are required to “organise all 
State organs and governance structures through which public authority is 
exercised in a manner consistent with the need to respect and ensure 
[human rights]”. This includes a duty of “continuous supervision” in 
order to “prevent, investigate, punish and remedy” any harm.81 As a 
result, actions such as the “sale […] of […] weapons”, and presumably 
other similar law enforcement and border control equipment, must be 
preceded by a conscientious examination of its foreseeable impact on 
human rights.82 As members of the international community and as 
subjects of customary law, States must take into account “their 
responsibility […] to protect lives and to oppose widespread or 
systematic attacks on [human rights]”83 – like those sustained by migrants 
in Libya.84 And, in particular, States have an obligation under general 
international law “not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States 
and non-State actors that violate [human rights]”.85  
All these reasons should lead to the rejection of “disembarkation 
platforms” and similar initiatives as “externalization fantasyland”.86 EU 
Member States should not invest in a formula that promotes cooperation 
with human rights perpetrators and impedes the fulfilment of their pre-
contracted obligations – such a course would hardly qualify as a good 
faith implementation of their binding commitments.87 Instead, domestic 
systems of territorial protection should be reinforced, including the 
necessary intra-EU solidarity and responsibility-sharing mechanisms to 
make them effective.88 Physical distance-creation, through off-shoring 
and outsourcing, does not translate into an erasure or diminution of legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 HRC, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant 
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2018, paras 7, 18, 19 and 21 (emphasis added). On the requirements of investigations, see 
paragraphs 27-28. The ECHR imposes similar positive obligations under Arts 2 and 3. See, 
e.g., Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi (n 68); M.S.S. (n 75); Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK App no 
8139/09 (ECtHR, 9 May 2012).  
82 HRC (n 81), para 65. 
83 Ibid., para 70. 
84 Amnesty International (n 33); Human Rights Watch (n 33). 
85 HRC (n 81),, para 63. 
86 C Woollard, ‘Editorial: Lost in Externalization Fantasyland’, ECRE Bulletin, 22 
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88 Art 80 TFEU. On the workings of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, see V Moreno-Lax (n 18).   
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duties. EU rules on “safe third countries” and readmission cannot 
(unilaterally) undo international standards.89 
 
 
3.2 Responsibility Denial 
 
Besides tools of responsibility deflection, mechanisms of outright 
denial of obligations are equally challenging. Usually, the capacitation of 
third countries’ control infrastructures, mimicking the Schengen 
“integrated border management” system,90 is framed as unproblematic. 
The transfer of funds, know-how, and equipment, as in the cases referred 
to in the previous section, are considered to emanate from a spirit of 
solidarity with non-EU partners and to be fully in line with the relevant 
criteria. The ethical distance between the EU or Member State gifting 
assets, ceding resources, or providing training and any potential human 
rights violations that may ensue is taken to preclude liability. There is no 
intent – no dolus specialis – intervening in the operation. Thus, the denial 
of responsibility on the European side for the atrocities in Libya, the 
abuses in Turkey, or the fatalities at sea associated with border-induced 
displacement, commonly recurs.91   
Yet, international law paints a more complex picture.92 If one 
considers that it is “thanks”93 to Italy, for instance, that the LYCG 
continues to exist in any functional form in the post-Kaddafi period,94 an 
outright denial of responsibility becomes difficult.95  
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rescued on 6th November 2017 by Sea Watch filed against Italy for their ‘pull-back’ 
operations conducted via the LYCG, ‘Migranti: UE “L’Italia rispetta le leggi”’, ANSA, 8 
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leggi_17faec35-69dc-445e-9ead-491706e595dc.html. For human rights violations 
occurring at sea since the outbreak of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, consult the Search and 
Rescue Observatory for the Mediterranean (SAROBMED),	  https://sarobmed.org/. 
92 On the specific matter of intent, see ARSIWA Commentary (n 64), p. 36: “it is 
only the act of a State that matters, independently of any intention”. In this line, see also V 
Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: An Appraisal of the State of the 
Art’, in A Knollkaemper and I Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 134, at 152 et seq.  
93 Chiragov and Others v Armenia App n. 13216/05 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015), para 
178. 
94 Cf. Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia App n. 43370/04, n. 8252/05, n. 
18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 October 2012), para 106. 
95 For a detailed review of Italy’s entanglement with the Libyan Coast Guard, see C 
Heller and L Pezzani, ‘Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem 
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Especially since the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding 
between Italy and the Libyan Government of National Accord in 
February 2017,96 the delivery of training, equipment, and assets 
(including the four main patrol vessels employed by the LYCG) has 
intensified. Italy has created a dedicated “Africa Fund”, € 2.5 million of 
which has been allocated to the maintenance of LYCG boats and the 
training of their crews.97 The EU, too, has committed € 46 million to prop 
up Libyan interdiction capacity.98 It has been calculated that the total 
combined investment by Italy and the EU will be € 285 million by 
2023,99 with the EU alone providing € 282 million – most of which via 
programmes administered, coordinated, or supervised by Italy.100 In 
addition, an extension of the Mare Sicuro Operation, named NAURAS,101 
was approved by the Italian Parliament in August 2017, consisting of four 
ships, four helicopters, and 600 servicemen, of which 70 per cent are 
deployed at sea, with the other 30 per cent stationed in Tripoli harbour. 
Their key mission, as declared by the Italian Navy itself, is to “establish 
[the] operational condition[s] for LN/LNCG [i.e. Libyan Navy and 
LYCG] assets and develop C2 [i.e. command-and-control] capabilities”. 
Meanwhile, an “ITN [i.e. Italian Navy] naval asset in Tripoli Harbour [is] 
acting as LNCC [i.e. Libyan Navy Communication Centre] and logistic 
assistance/support hub”, thus assuming the function of a floating 
maritime rescue coordination centre.102  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Migration across the Mediterranean’, Forensic Oceanography, May 2018, Forensic 
Architecture, www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-05-07-FO-
Mare-Clausum-full-EN.pdf.  
96 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, 2 February 2017, English translation, 
https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf. 
97 The practice has been contested and a legal challenge is currently pending in this 
regard. See ‘NGO Takes Italy to Court over Misappropriation of Development Funds 
Directed to Libyan Coastguards’, ECRE News, 24 November 2017, www.ecre.org/ngo-
takes-italy-to-court-over-misappropriation-of-development-funds-directed-to-libyan-
coastguards.  
98 European Commission, EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya, 8 May 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-ly-08052018.pdf.  
99 ‘EU and Italy put Aside €285m to Boost Libyan Coast Guard’, EU Observer, 29 
November 2017, https://euobserver.com/migration/140067. 
100 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Libya, (undated), 
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya. 
101 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Rome, Guardia costiera italiana, Annual 
Report 2017, www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/attivita/Documents/attivita-sar-immigrazione-
2017/Rapporto_annuale_2017_ENG.pdf.  
102  Italian Navy, Operation Mare Sicuro Presentation, SHADE MED Briefing, 23-24 
November 2017 (on file with the authors).  
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The nature of the LYCG as a proxy for Italian interdiction has 
furthermore been confirmed by the judge of Catania adjudicating on the 
related case concerning the rescue ship Open Arms of the NGO Proactiva. 
In his decision, the judge takes as proven the crucial role played by Italy 
in leading LYCG operations. The judge goes so far as to affirm that the 
interventions of Libyan patrol vessels happen “under the aegis of the 
Italian Navy” and that the coordination of rescue missions is “essentially 
entrusted to the Italian Navy, with its own naval assets and with those 
provided to the Libyans”.103 This corroborates the “high degree of 
integration” between the two,104 and the “effective control” exercised by 
Italy over LYCG operations, making ensuing violations attributable to 
it.105  
The subsequent abuse of those pulled back to Tripoli happens despite 
Italy’s knowledge of the desperate situation facing migrants in Libya, 
including widespread and systematic torture, rape, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and enslavement. The Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs himself admitted that “taking [migrants] back to Libya, at this 
moment, means taking them back to hell”.106 Nonetheless, the interdiction 
by proxy policy of Italy continues.107 Amnesty International estimates 
that there are over 10,000 persons currently held in official detention 
centres in Libya – all of which funded through EU/Italian money. And, 
virtually all of them have been brought there as a result of their 
interdiction at sea by the EU/Italian-equipped and -trained LYCG.108 
Consequently, the combination of control exercised – though 
“contactless”109 – and the knowledge of the circumstances migrants face 
should be understood to render Italy answerable for the resulting human 
rights violations, even if the LYCG is used as a surrogate.  
As per Article 8 ARSIWA, “[t]he conduct of a person or group of 
persons [such as the LYCG] shall be considered an act of a State [i.e. 
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2018, 22, www.dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.it/allegati/fascicolo-n-2-2018/256-trib-
catania-27-3-2018/file.  
104 Chiragov and Others v Armenia (n 93), paragraphs 176 and 186. 
105 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (n 68), para 138 et seq. 
106  ‘Giro: Fare rientrare quelle persone vuol dire condannarle all’inferno’, La 
Stampa, 6 August 2017, www.lastampa.it/2017/08/06/italia/cronache/giro-fare-rientrare-
quelle-persone-vuol-dire-condannarle-allinferno-
SXnGzVlzftFl7fNGFCMADN/pagina.html. 
107  ‘Nigerian migrants sue Italy for aiding Libyan coast guard’, Reuters, 8 May 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy/nigerian-migrants-sue-italy-for-
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108 Amnesty International, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (n 37), 17-18. 
109 V Moreno-Lax and MG Giuffré (n 24).   
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Italy in this case]”, when the group in question “is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying 
out the conduct”. Taking the Italian Navy and the Judge of Catania’s 
assertions at face value, the LYCG are to be considered “auxiliaries” of 
the Italian border machinery deployed extraterritorially, “instructed to 
carry out particular [interdiction] missions abroad”. The Italian Navy 
conducts the specific operations through its NAURAS effectives 
exercising coordination as well as command-and-control functions, 
meaning that the (wrongful) conduct of the LYCG shall be considered 
“an integral part of the operations” aimed at impeding departures across 
the Central Mediterranean and thus be attributed to Italy.110 It is the 
Italian authorities that locate targets, relay maritime coordinates, and 
equip and mandate the LYCG to proceed to the interdiction of migrant 
boats.111 It is Italy that “directs” the operations in a way that “does not 
encompass mere incitement or suggestion but rather connotes actual 
direction of an operative kind”.112 Italian intervention is a sine qua non 
for the “pull-backs” at sea to materialise, which could not be carried out 
autonomously by the LYCG.113 Italy exercises “such a degree of control 
[…] as to justify treating the [LYCG] as acting on its behalf”.114  
Italy’s involvement in Libyan search and rescue (or rather, 
interdiction) operations, in different ways and throughout time, rather 
than just an instance of complicity,115 engaging indirect responsibility, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 ARSIWA Commentary (n 64), p. 47.  
111 A Palladino, “Cercate i guardacoste libici? Telefonate a Roma: 06/…”, Il Fatto 
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edicola/articoli/2018/04/18/cercate-i-guardacoste-libici-telefonate-a-roma-06/4299475/. 
For a visual reconstruction of events occurring on 6th November 2017 between Sea Watch 
and the Libyan Coast Guard in a rescue operation coordinated by Italy, see ‘“It’s an Act of 
Murder”: How Europe Outsources Suffering as Migrants Drown’, New York Times, 26 
December 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/opinion/europe-migrant-
crisis-mediterranean-libya.html. For the general trend, see Mare Clausum (n 95). 
112 ARSIWA Commentary (n 64), p. 69 (emphasis added), regarding Art 17 
ARSIWA on “direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act” (heading). 
113 Confirming this finding, see IMO, Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
Project submitted by Italy, NCSR 5/INF.17, 15 December 2017, Executive Summary: 
“This document provides information on the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(LMRCC) Project, an initiative run by the Italian Coast Guard and funded by the 
European Commission, with the aim of conducting a feasibility study in order to establish a 
Libyan MRCC […]”, which, for the time being, is lacking (emphasis added). 
114 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), [1986] 
ICJ Rep. 14, pp. 62 and 64–65, paragraphs 109 and 115. 
115 Making this case, see G Pascale, ‘“Esternalizzazione” delle frontiere in chiave 
antimigratoria e responsabilità internazionale dell’Italia e dell’UE per complicità nelle 
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can thus be characterised as a breach entailing direct responsibility, 
consisting of a “composite act”. Article 15 ARSIWA establishes that an 
international obligation (of non-refoulement, for instance, and of non-
arbitrary interference with the right to leave) may indeed be violated via 
“a series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful”. The 
financing or training of the LYCG alone may be harmless and perfectly 
licit, but, when taken together and alongside the infiltration of the 
command-and-control chain of the LYCG by the Italian Navy, the whole, 
in light of the final outcome of pull-backs, becomes an illicit under 
international law.  
Italian jurisdiction may indeed be engaged not only in relation to 
action occurring within its territory and in other areas subject to its 
“effective control”, but, as the Human Rights Committee has stated, also 
regarding conduct “having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on 
the right[s] […] of individuals [abroad]”.116 The obligation to respect and 
protect human rights extends beyond territorial domain to all persons 
subject to its jurisdiction, that is, to “all persons over whose enjoyment of 
the right[s] [concerned] it exercises power”, including “persons located 
outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose [rights are] 
nonetheless impacted by its military and other activities” – the transfer of 
money, equipment and enforcement capacity thus acquiring a 
significance of its own as a possible trigger of independent responsibility 
for wrongful conduct.117 Not only the aiding and abetting of human rights 
violations is of relevance, whatever the form the assistance provided to 
the LYCG may take (whether commercial, financial, political, or 
logistical), but also actions (or omissions) that impede the effective 
enjoyment of human rights – counting the right to leave any country, to 
seek protection from harm, and to non-refoulement – matter too, from a 
legal perspective.118 Following the Legal Service of the European 
Parliament in the context of its viability analysis of “disembarkation 
platforms”, engagement in any formal or informal arrangement with third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gross violations dei diritti umani commesse in Libia’ (2018) 13 Studi sull’integrazione 
europea 413. See also R Mackenzie-Gray Scott, ‘Torture in Libya and Questions of EU 
Member States Complicity’, EJILTalk!, 11 January 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/torture-
in-libya-and-questions-of-eu-member-state-complicity/.   
116 Mutatis mutandis, HRC General Comment (n 81), para 22. 
117 Ibid., para 63 (emphasis added). For a similar reasoning by the Strasbourg Court, 
see Al-Skeini (n 68); Jaloud v The Netherlands, App no 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 
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118 Cf. A Brown, ‘To Complicity… and Beyond! Passive Assistance and Positive 
Obligations in International law’ (2016) 27 Hague Yearbook of International Law 133. 
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countries – including Libya – to finance or contribute to the functioning 
of externalized structures of migration control “have to respect the 
prescriptions of the relevant provisions of international law”119 – 
presumably including those under the ECHR, the ICCPR and general 
customary norms.120 Failure to do so flouts the obligations concerned. 
Direct perpetration of an international wrong is not a pre-requisite for 
legal responsibility. Indirect contraventions – including via proxy – incur 
liability as well.121 
Distance-creation, through the “rulification” of “irresponsibility” in 
legal texts or self-seeking effectuations, does not do away with 
international obligations, nor does it legitimize the suffering it provokes. 
The EU and its Member States must come to recognise the predictable 
effect and implications of their externalization agenda. And, alongside the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, acknowledge that, as currently 
designed, their “migration policies can amount to ill-treatment”.122 
Actually, “[t]he primary cause for the massive abuse suffered by migrants 
[...] is neither migration itself, nor organised crime [...] but the growing 
tendency of States to base their official migration policies and practices 
on deterrence, criminalisation and discrimination”.123 It is this distinct 
strategy that causes border-induced displacement, breaches human rights 
obligations and triggers international legal responsibility.124 
 
 
4. Conclusion: “Rulification” as the Co-Option of Protection 
 
“Rulification” does not represent a paradigm shift in European 
politics, but rather an up-scaling of the logic observable also in proposals 
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pursued from the 1980s and onwards and which have led to the 
integration of the concepts of “first country of arrival”, “safe third 
country” and maritime interdiction within the legal architecture of the 
common borders and asylum acquis, the primary purpose of which has 
been the avoidance of asylum seekers on EU territory. It is the abuse and 
exploitation entrenched within externalization strategies that engenders 
border-induced displacement in Europe’s border-region. With EU 
Member States viewing the opening up of legal escape routes as an 
irrational concession, the side-effects of externalization are exacerbated 
as the systemic logic of asymmetric, diffused, and denied responsibility 
for displaced persons is reproduced further and further away from 
Europe, and closer and closer to the repressive regimes people attempt to 
escape from. 
The reactionary and regionalist assumptions underpinning 
externalization arguments and practices tell a securitized tale of 
displacements constantly generated and managed far removed from 
European territory and agency. However, distance-creation strategies, 
whether ethical, spatial, or legal, belong to the category of “policies based 
on deterrence, militarization and extraterritoriality”, denounced by UN 
Special Rapporteurs and others, “which implicitly or explicitly tolerate 
[and perpetuate] the risk of migrant deaths as part of an effective control 
of entry”.125 As the previous sections demonstrate, the structural nature of 
externalization problematizes traditional assumptions and debates in 
immigration ethics and politics. It traps migrants in a “vicious circle” of 
more control, more danger, and more displacement, where they must rely 
on facilitators to escape life-threatening perils.126  
But smuggling and trafficking is the consequence, rather than the 
cause, of suffering. Suffering is embedded in the externalization system 
by design through the vehicle of “rulification”, which serves to launder 
the pernicious (and perfectly foreseeable) impact of extra-
territorialised/externalised coercion into “law-ified” (and purportedly 
unintended) side effects. At the same time, the European transfer of 
equipment and capacity for control outwards also risks undermining 
processes of accountability and democratic legitimacy in regions 
bordering Europe. And the “rulification” of border-induced displacement 
does not make these implications any more palatable. In the words of UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Agnès Callamard, A/72/335 (2018), para 10. 
126 H de Haas, ‘Borders beyond Control’, International Migration Institute Network 
(January 2015), www.imi-n.org/imi-archive/news/borders-beyond-control-blog-by-hein-
de-haas. 
27 
	  
Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard, it is simply “not acceptable” to 
deter entry by endangering life.127 The fallacy of coercion-based 
protection needs to give way to an ethically grounded and legally 
sustainable rights-honouring paradigm. This is not to contest the legal 
existence of borders or their enforcement, but to challenge the legitimacy 
of mechanisms through which they are presently enacted in a manner 
incompatible with the most basic requirements of international law. 
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